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CHALLENGING THE WISDOM OF SOLOMON: THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND MILITARY RECRUITMENT ON CAMPUS
Clay Calvert* & Robert D. Richards-
INTRODUCTION
Times of war and First Amendment' controversies - the two invariably and
inevitably go hand in hand. Whether it is Paul Robert Cohen's anti-draftjacket2 and
the publication of the so-called Pentagon Papers3 during the conflict in Vietnam, or
Charles T. Schenck' s anti-draft leaflets 4 and the publication of the Staats Zeitung 5
* Associate Professor of Communications & Law and Co-Director of the Pennsylvania
CenterfortheFirstAmendmentatPennsylvaniaStateUniversity. B.A., 1987, Communication,
Stanford University; J.D. (Order of the Coif), 1991, McGeorge School of Law, University
of the Pacific; Ph.D., 1996, Communication, Stanford University. Member, State Bar of
California. The authors thank Lee Langston and Rachel Frankel of the Schreyer Honors
College at Pennsylvania State University for their research and editorial assistance that
contributed to this article.
** Professor of Journalism & Law and Founding Co-Director of the Pennsylvania
Center for the First Amendment at Pennsylvania State University. B.A., 1983, M.A. 1984,
Communications, Pennsylvania State University; J.D., 1987, American University. Member,
State Bar of Pennsylvania.
' The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part that
"Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S.
CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses have been incorporated through
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause to apply to state and local government
entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
2 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (protecting, as freedom of expression, the
right to wear a jacket emblazoned with the words "Fuck the Draft" in a Los Angeles
courthouse corridor).
3 N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (rejecting, as an unconstitutional
prior restraint against freedom of expression, the efforts of the federal government to enjoin
The New York Times and Washington Post from publishing the contents of a classified study
entitled "History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Vietnam Policy").
' Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (upholding, against a First Amendment
argument to the contrary, the conviction of Schenck for violating anti-sedition laws, and
creating the clear and present danger test for determining when speech is not protected). See
generally JEREMY COHEN, CONGRESS SHALL MAKE No LAW: OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,
THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AND JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 90-104 (1989) (providing an
analysis of the judicial process from which the Schenck decision was molded).
' Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919) (upholding the conviction, against a
First Amendment argument to the contrary, of Frohwerk for publishing anti-war sentiments
in a German-language newspaper). See generally RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN
OPEN SOCtETY 99-100 (1992) (criticizing the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Frohwerk).
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during World War I, the confluence of conflict and communication creates
litigation.
The situation today, with fighting in both Iraq and Afghanistan, is no exception.
For instance, several access-related disputes already have arisen. Notably, publisher
Larry C. Flynt6 lost a legal fight before a federal appellate court in February 2004,
in which he claimed a First Amendment right of news media access to United States
troops in combat operations in the Middle East.7 The press lost an earlier battle for
access to special-interest deportation hearings of individuals with knowledge of the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks when the Supreme Court declined to review a
federal appellate court's decision in North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft.8
While these First Amendment access battles are now complete, another fight
involving a very different type of access - access sought by the military, not by the
press or private individuals - is now hitting full stride, and it is the subject of this
article. In particular, a number of prominent law school professors, as well as a
collection of anonymous law schools, 9 are challenging the constitutionality of a
federal statute known as the Solomon Amendment." This law allows the government
to deny federal funding to institutions of higher education that prevent on-campus
military recruiting. 1 The professors in Forum forAcademic and Institutional Rights,
Inc. v. Rumsfeld,2 as well as those involved in three other cases simultaneously
challenging the federal law, 3 are using the First Amendment not to gain access for
6 Flynt is a publisher of sexually explicit magazines, such as Hustler and Barely Legal.
See generally Clay Calvert & Robert Richards, Larry Flynt Uncensored: A Dialogue with
the Most Controversial Figure in FirstAmendment Jurisprudence, 9 COMMLAWCONSPECTUS
159 (2001) (providing an in-depth look at, and interview with, Larry C. Flynt).
Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 355 F.3d 697 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1056 (2003).
The Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR), the organization that is
spearheading the litigation in the case that is the focus of this article, "is not releasing the
names of member schools" on the grounds that "anonymity is important to protect law
schools from retribution." Marcella Bombardieri, United States Defense Department Sued
on College Recruitment, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 20, 2003, at B 1.
10 10 U.S.C. § 983(b) (2003).
Id.
12 291 F. Supp. 2d 269 (D. N.J. 2003).
'3 In total, four separate lawsuits have been filed "against the Defense Department over
the military's right to recruit on law-school campuses." Alice Gomstyn, Military Recruiting
Goes to Court, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 12, 2003, at A17.
In addition to the lawsuit brought by FAIR, a lawsuit was filed in October 2003 by
twenty-one professors, one student organization, and six students at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School. Burbank v. Rumsfeld, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17509 (E.D. Pa.
2004). Another lawsuit was filed that same month by members of the faculty of the Yale Law
School. Burt v. Rumsfeld, 322 F. Supp. 2d 189 (D. Conn. 2004). Finally, a number of Yale
law students filed their own lawsuit challenging the Solomon Amendment. Student Members
of SAME v. Rumsfeld, 321 F. Supp. 2d 388 (D. Conn. 2004).
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themselves but, instead, to deny it to the military. More precisely, the plaintiffs in
ForumforAcademic and Institutional Rights contend that the Solomon Amendment
"conditions a benefit - federal funding - on the surrendering of law schools' First
Amendment rights of academic freedom, free speech, and freedom of expressive
association," and is unconstitutional. 4 The case thus represents a radical departure
from the access disputes described above involving Larry Flynt and the North Jersey
Media Group in which the First Amendment was used as a tool to try to gain access,
not as a weapon to try to prevent it.15
The professors and law schools involved, however, are using the First Amend-
ment to promote positive Fourteenth Amendment-based principles of equality
under the law. 16 As Kent Greenfield, 7 a professor of law at Boston College and the
president of the lead plaintiff organization in Forum for Academic and Institutional
Rights, put it in a Washington Post commentary in November 2003:
Imagine if the government took away the driver's license of
anyone who opposed pay raises for government bureaucrats.
Imagine it cut off Social Security benefits to retirees who
protested the Iraq war. Suppose it withheld a university's cancer
research funds because the school refused to support the mili-
tary' s policy of discrimination against gays and lesbians.
That last example isn't imaginary - it's the law of the land.
The law is called the Solomon Amendment, and it gives the
Department of Defense the power to cut federal funds to universi-
ties unless they give up deeply held beliefs about the equality of
students.
The statute is pockmarked with constitutional flaws. Primary
among them is the government's attempt to use the power of
the purse to reshape the academic environment and suppress
educational messages in ways it could never accomplish by
direct command.
8
"' Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 274.
15 Supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
6 The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part
that a state may not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
7 See Kent Greenfield Profile, at http://www.bc.edu/schoolslaw/fac-staff/deans-faculty/
greenfieldk (last visited June 4, 2004) (Greenfield teaches "corporate law, administrative law,
constitutional law, and business theory" and "served as a law clerk to Justice David H.
Souter, of the United States Supreme Court, and to Judge Levin H. Campbell, of the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. He also worked at the law firm of Covington
& Burling, in Washington, D.C.").
8 Kent Greenfield, Imposing Inequality on Law Schools, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 2003,
at A25.
2004]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Despite such impassioned pleas, Judge John C. Litland denied the plaintiffs'
motion for a preliminary injunction in November 2003 "on the basis that Plaintiffs
[did] not establish a likelihood of success on the merits of their constitutional
challenges to the Solomon Amendment."' 9 The case is now pending before the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, with the plaintiffs having filed their
brief in January 2004,20 supported by a host of amici curiae including the American
Civil Liberties Union,21 the Association of American Law Schools,22 and members
of the faculty of Harvard Law School.23
This article, using the briefs and motions filed by the parties, as well as the
judicial opinions issued to date, examines the First Amendment issues at stake in the
ongoing litigation in Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights. In particular,
Part I describes the history of the Solomon Amendment, tracing its evolution from
initial proposal to its current version and the Department of Defense's interpretation
of its meaning, as well as the aggressive enforcement of the law since September 11,
2001.24 Part II then describes, contextualizes, and critiques the arguments of the
parties now before the appellate court as they relate to the First Amendment issues
in the case.25 Next, Part Ell analyzes the district court's opinion regarding those
issues and the denial of the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction.26
Part IV contends that this case is really about two sets of competing First
Amendment interests - those of the military to engage in expressive activity at law
schools (at least public law schools, for purposes of constitutional concern) across
the United States which have created limited public fora for recruiters, and those of
law schools not to associate with and give voice to the views of the military within
academic fora.27 The First Amendment issues, in turn, are complicated and clouded
by the context in which the case will be decided: an increasingly controversial war
"9 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 275.
20 Brief for Appellants, Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, No.
03-4433 (3d Cir. filed Jan. 5, 2004).
21 Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union et al. in Support of Appellants,
Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, No. 03-4433 (3d Cir. filed
Jan. 12, 2004).
22 Brief of Amicus Curiae Association of American Law Schools in Support of
Appellants, Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, No. 03-4433 (3d
Cir. filed Jan. 12, 2004).
2' Brief of Professors William Alford et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants and
in Support of Reversal, Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, No.
03-4433 (3d Cir. filed Jan. 16, 2004).
24 Infra notes 33-69 and accompanying text.
25 Infra notes 70--166 and accompanying text.
26 Infra notes 167-235 and accompanying text.
27 Infra notes 236-68 and accompanying text.
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in Iraq; 28 the subtext of gay and lesbian rights that extends beyond the discrimina-
tory "don't ask, don't tell" military policy 29 into the current battle over gay marriage
against which President George W. Bush has spoken out;3" and the nascent legacy
of the Supreme Court's opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger.3 When viewed within the
larger context of the confluence of these cultural and legal forces, the battle over the
Solomon Amendment really amounts to a classic clash between the conservative
military machine of the Bush Administration and the elite liberal confines of academia.
Finally, Part V concludes the article by arguing that the First Amendment
interests of the plaintiffs-appellants outweigh the recruitment interests of the
military, and that the appellate court should enter an order enjoining enforcement
of the Solomon Amendment.32
I. THE SOLOMON AMENDMENT: ITS EVOLUTION AND INTERPRETATION
Back in 1994, there was "a bill moving through Congress with little fanfare."33
A decade later, however, it would spark a firestorm of litigation. The measure in
question was first offered in May 1994 by Gerald B. Solomon, a New York Republican
then in the House of Representatives, as one of many amendments' to a massive bill
authorizing appropriations for fiscal year 1995 for the military activities of the
28 The Solomon Amendment affects the ability of the military to recruit college-educated
individuals to play a role in the war in Iraq, as well as other future wars and conflicts. The
timing of the now-vigorous enforcement of the Solomon Amendment, as discussed in Part
I, makes it clear that the case now before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit cannot be divorced from the wartime context.
29 See generally Ron Martz, Clinton OKs 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' Military Ban on Gays
Is Eased but Not Ended, ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 20, 1993, at Al (using the term "don't
ask, don't tell, don't pursue" to describe the policy adopted by President Bill Clinton in July
1993 under which gay men and lesbians are allowed to serve in the military but can be
dismissed for homosexual conduct).
30 See generally Mike Allen, Bush Highlights Social Issues: Culture Joins Terrorism,
Economy in New Campaign Speech, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2004, at A8 (President George
W. Bush called for a constitutional amendment to ban gay marriage and stated that Americans
"will not stand for judges who undermine democracy by legislating from the bench, or try
to remake the culture of America by court order.").
3 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (holding that "the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit
the Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions").
32 Infra notes 269-90 and accompanying text.
3 Dennis Kelly, Congress Pressures Schools to AcceptMilitary Recruiters, USA TODAY,
June 28, 1994, at 6D.
34 H. AMEND. 569, 103d Cong. (1994), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/dl03-
query.html.
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Department of Defense. 35 A similar amendment was offered in July 1994 bv Don
Nickles, an Oklahoma Republican, in the United States Senate.36
Collectively, the amendments prohibited Department of Defense funds from
being provided to institutions of higher education that deny campus access for
military recruiting purposes. The House easily approved Solomon's amendment by
a 271-126 vote on May 23, 1994,37 and Nickles's bill was approved by a voice vote
in the Senate on July 1 of that same year.38
Nickles observed at the time that "more than 100 colleges and universities
across the country prohibit military recruiters on campus. Yet many are quite
receptive when it comes to taking research grants from the Pentagon .... This bill
will correct that situation. 39 Solomon, citing a decrease in interest in the military
due to defense cuts, added "it's even more important now that recruiters have access
to campuses to attract the best-qualified young men and women. '
Solomon, a former Marine "who in the 1980s sponsored an amendment that cut
college aid to young men who had not registered for the draft,"'" was serving in
1994 as chair of the House of Representatives Rules Committee - a key position
because it is the body "that decides which amendments should be considered for
which bills., 4' Around the same time, he also was leading the fight for legislation
that was similarly imbued with deeply conservative undertones - a constitutional
amendment that would allow states to ban desecration of the American flag. 43 just
3' National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-337, 108
Stat. 2663 (1994).36 S. AMEND. 2148, 103d Cong. (1994), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/d103-
query.html.
3' Kelly, supra note 33.
38 Douglas Turner, Senate Links Funds to Military Recruiting, BUFF. NEWS, July 3, 1994,
at 12.
39 Id.
o Kelly, supra note 33.
"' Christina Cheakalos, Military Gets Off Bias Hook; GSU Law School Fears for Funds,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Sept. 20, 1997, at F2.
42 Scott Jaschik, Bowdoin College Drops Ban on Military Recruiters in Response to a
Congressman's Legislative Campaign, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 3, 1995, at A25.
43 Katharine Q. Seelye, House Easily Passes Amendment to Ban Desecration of Flag,
N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1995, at A 1. Solomon would lead similar fights for such an amendment
in future years. See John Brinkley, Skaggs Tries to Derail Resolution Seeking Ban on Flag
Desecration, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver), Feb. 14, 1997, at 49A (describing how
Solomon was leading the charge in 1997 for an anti-desecration amendment). The topic of
amending the United States Constitution to prohibit the burning of the American flag is still
generating controversy in 2004, several years after Solomon's death. See Vivian Berger, Flag
'Desecration': Persuade, Don't Punish, N.J. L.J., Jan. 26, 2004 (describing how the issue
worked its way into the primaries for the 2004 Democratic nominee for President of the
United States).
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as First Amendment controversies inevitably surround the symbolic speech' that is
flag burning, 5 so too would they later engulf Solomon's military recruitment
legislation.
The Solomon Amendment, which "builds on nearly three decades of predeces-
sor legislation addressing the perceived effects of anti-military policies on military
recruiting,"" was first fully carried out in April 1996."7 It quickly became entangled
with the burgeoning gay rights movement and non-discrimination policies, as many
universities, both public and private, objected to the Pentagon's anti-gay policies,
including its policy that allows openly gay individuals to be dismissed from the
military.48 Those universities, in turn, banned military recruiters from campus
because the military discriminates based on sexual orientation.49
The military's policy on homosexuals, announced in a controversial Secretary
of Defense memorandum dated July 19, 1993, distills to this:
' See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONsTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
§ 11.3.6, at 1026-27 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing the symbolic speech doctrine under which
certain forms of conduct are considered expression for purposes of First Amendment
protection).
" See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (holding that the Flag Protection
Act of 1989 is inconsistent with the First Amendment protection of freedom of expression);
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (reversing the criminal conviction of Gregory Lee
Johnson for flag desecration and protecting the public burning of an American flag as a
means of political protest).
Solomon, however, saw no First Amendment issues in the flag burning controversy,
telling a reporter shortly after his proposal for a constitutional amendment against desecration
of the U.S. flag passed overwhelmingly in the United States House of Representatives in
June 1995:
Our goal is to restore the constitution to the way it was for the first 200
years of our nation's history. Today, we propose to restore the right of
the people to protect our American flag. Some of the opponents of this
proposal have tried to make it sound like there's some kind of threat to
free speech. For 200 years, no one thought it denied them anything.
They thought it protected the flag.
Nancy Mathis, House OKs Amendment to Snuff Out Flag Burning, HOUS. CHRON., June 29,
1995, at 1.
46 Brief of Professors William Alford et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants and
in Support of Reversal at 4, Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld,
No. 03-4433 (3d Cir. filed Jan. 16, 2004) (citation omitted).
41 See Carey Goldberg, Colleges Feel Cost of Shunning Recruiters Over Gay Rights
Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1996, at A22 ("A new Federal law cuts off all Department of
Defense grant money to institutions, public as well as private, that bar military recruiters, and
last week that law began to be fully carried out said Representative Gerald B. H. Solomon,
the Republican from upstate New York who fathered it.").
48 Id.
49 Id.
2004]
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Individuals who apply for a commission or want to enlist are
told about the policy of excluding and separating known homo-
sexuals, but are not questioned about their sexual propensities
and experience. In effect, they are cautioned not to volunteer the
information if they should happen to be homosexual. Once in
the service, they are expected to conform to standards that
include refraining from consensual sodomy or related sexual
crimes .... "
Campus activists at prestigious universities such as New York University
School of Law "pushed for a strong position against the [Solomon] amendment as
a way to protest President Clinton's 'don't ask, don't tell' policy on gays in the
military."'" When their university failed to take action against the government,
savvy law students at New York University who were reportedly, "queers or queer-
friendly," would reserve all of the interviews with military recruiters and show up
donning buttons proclaiming "JAG OFF."'12
The Solomon Amendment also conflicted with the policy of the Association of
American Law Schools, "which has required since 1990 that its members have
policies that ban discrimination based on sexual orientation."53 As United States
District Court Judge John C. Lifland wrote in his November 2003 opinion in Forum
forAcademic and Institutional Rights, "[1]aw schools are loathe to endorse or assist
recruiting efforts of the United States military because of its policy against
homosexual activity.""
Under the terms at issue in Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, the
Solomon Amendment applies to any funds made available by either the Department
of Defense or the Department of Homeland Security, as well as to any funds made
available by the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education,
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act." In particular, no such funds:
may be provided by contract or by grant (including a grant of
funds to be available for student aid) to an institution of higher
50 Arthur A. Murphy et al., Gays in the Military: WhatAbout Morality, Ethics, Character
and Honor?, 99 DICK. L. REV. 331, 332 (1995).
"' Siobhan Gorman, Pentagon Launches Recruiting Offensive, 30 NAT'L J. 942, 942
(1998).
52 Safir Ahmed, Don'tAsk, Don't Tell, Don't Fight, RIVERFRONT TIMES (Mo.), Nov. 22,
2000, at Columns, LEXIS, MO library, RIVTMS file.
53 Katherine S. Mangan, Law Students and Professors Start Drive Against Law on
Military Recruiting, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 12, 1999, at A36.
-4 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 281 (D. N.J. 2003).
5 10 U.S.C. § 983(d)(2) (2003).
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education (including any subelement of such institution) if the
Secretary of Defense determines that that institution (or any
subelement of that institution) has a policy or practice (regard-
less of when implemented) that either prohibits, or in effect
prevents -
(1) the Secretary of a military department or Secretary of
Homeland Security from gaining entry to campuses, or access to
students (who are 17 years of age or older) on campuses, for
purposes of military recruiting; or
(2) access by military recruiters for purposes of military
recruiting to the following information pertaining to students
(who are 17 years of age or older) enrolled at that institution (or
any subelement of that institution):
(A) Names, addresses, and telephone listings.
(B) Date and place of birth, levels of education, academic
majors, degrees received, and the most recent educational
institution enrolled in by the student.5 6
What, in a nutshell, does all of this mean? From the perspective of one
politician-attorney who is a proponent of the law, "[i]f you're getting our [govern-
ment] dollars, you've got to let us in."57 Conversely, from the perspective of a
Solomon Amendment opponent, it boils down to an "extortionist way of legislating.
Any law school that is committed to keeping an academic environment free of
discrimination is practically compelled to permit onto campus a blatantly discrimi-
natory organization - which just happens to be the U.S. military."58
Enforcement of, and controversy regarding, the Solomon Amendment was
largely dormant for several years,59 but all of that changed after the terrorist attacks
on the Word Trade Center and the Pentagon.6 0 As the Boston Globe reported:
56 10 U.S.C. § 983(b) (2003).
" Michelle Lore, Law Schools Closely Monitor Suit Over the Solomon Amendment,
MINN. LAW., Nov. 3, 2003, at News, LEXIS, LEGNEWS library, MINLAW file (quoting
Don Betzold, a Minnesota state senator and "a Brooklyn Center attorney and a retired Army
Reserve colonel").
" Id. (quoting attorney Philip A. Duran, a "past president of the Minnesota Lavender Bar
Association, a group of Minnesota attorneys and others dedicated to addressing sexual and
gender identity issues within the legal profession").
51 See Patrick Healy, Law Lets Colleges Bar Military Recruiters Without Risking a Loss
of Student Aid, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 5, 1999, at A38 (According to a spokesperson
from the Defense Department, "[n]o college or institution ha[d] lost funds under the Solomon
Amendment in recent years," and the Pentagon had "worked out the differences" with the
three colleges and seven law schools that it deemed were out of compliance with the law.).
60 See Peter H. Schuck, Equal Opportunity Recruiting, AM. LAW., Jan. 2004, at 57
20041
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Three months after the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, recruiters
from JAG began enforcing Solomon with fresh vigor. They sent
letters - copies of which were obtained by the Globe - to
about 25 of the nation's 220 law schools objecting to three kinds
of limits placed on JAG recruiting: outright bans, prohibitions
against recruiting in law school buildings, and other limits on
military recruiters that are more restrictive than for private law
firms.6
The timing for such vigorous enforcement was fitting as a posthumous gift
and legacy for Gerald Solomon, who died in October 2001.62 For a man who once
challenged Representative Patrick Kennedy, a Rhode Island: Democrat, to "step
outside" during a heated debate on the floor of the House of Representatives,63 the
real fight of his legislative legacy would begin shortly after his death. As the
Pentagon in late 2001 and into 2002 "ratcheted up the pressure in its most recent
round of reviews" ' 4 of the recruiting policies of law schools across the United States,
the military "presented law schools with a choice: Administrators can either stand
by their policies denying recruitment opportunities to employers that, like the
military, discriminate against gay people, or lose hundreds of millions of dollars in
federal research funds. 65 While many law school administrators chose to comply
with the law rather than suffer funding cuts' or take on a legal battle,67 FAIR, the
(observing that the Solomon Amendment "remained essentially a dead letter until the
September 11 terrorist attacks"). There were some instances in the timejust before September
11, 2001, however, of the government enforcing the policy. For instance, Washington
University School of Law in St. Louis, Missouri, allowed military recruiters back on campus
in February 2001 for the first time in a decade after "the Defense Department threatened to
withhold federal funding from the entire university if any part of a university didn't allow
recruiters." Greg Jonsson, WU Law Students Protest Return ofMilitary Recruiters, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 24, 2001, at 7.
6 Patrick Healy, Despite Concerns, Law Schools Admit Military Recruiters, BOSTON
GLOBE, Nov. 12, 2002, at Al.
62 See Christopher Marquis, Gerald Solomon, 71; Spurred Conservative Causes in
House, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2001, at D7 (providing the obituary of Solomon, who died of
congestive heart failure at seventy-one years of age).
63 William Goldschlag, Solomon to Retire; 3rd N.Y. GOP Rep to Quit, DAILY NEWS
(N.Y.), Apr. 28, 1998, at 51.
6 Richard Morgan, AmidProtests, Defense Department Steps UpRecruitmentat Top Law
Schools, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 18, 2002, at A26.
65 id.
6 For instance, 2003 marked:
the second year that Yale Law School waived its nondiscrimination
policy to allow military recruiters to participate in its interview
program - despite a longstanding policy that bars employers who
[Vol. 13:205
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Society of American Law Teachers (SALT),6' and a few individually-named
plaintiffs, such as the University of Southern California's Erwin Chemerinsky,69
chose to take the military to court to challenge the Solomon Amendment. The
issues and arguments of the parties, as they relate to the First Amendment, are set
forth in Part II of this article.
II. FORUM FOR ACADEMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, INC. V. RUMSFELD: THE
FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS
The issue before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights is a simply phrased, yet exceedingly
complex issue: "Whether the Solomon Amendment violates the Free Speech Clause
of the First Amendment."7 While that is the government's succinct phrasing of the
discriminate against gays. The law school backed down after the
Pentagon threatened to cut off $320 million in federal aid to the
university following 9/11.
Kim Martineau, Students Protest Military Interviews, HARTFORD COURANT (Conn.), Oct. 10,
2003, at B 1.
Yale was far from alone in taking the path of compliance. As the Boston Herald reported
in October 2002, Boston College "joins other law schools nationwide, including Harvard,
that are now allowing military recruiting for fear of losing millions of dollars in federal
funds." Jessica Heslam, Law Students Rip Military Campus Recruiting While Services Ban
Gays, BOSTON HERALD, Oct. 4, 2002, at 13.
7 See, e.g., New England in Brief/Cambridge; Harvard to Allow Military Recruiters,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 26, 2003, at B2 (noting that Harvard Law School "would not sign on
to litigation challenging the policy, known as the Solomon Amendment").
68 SALT is "America's largest membership organization for teachers of law." SALT:
Society of American Law Teachers, at http://www.saltlaw.org (last visited June 5, 2004).
SALT is "a national organization of approx. 800 law professors." Paula C. Johnson Profile,
at http://www.law.syr.edu/faculty (last visited June 5, 2004). The official Web site of SALT
identifies three main missions for the organization:
- creating and maintaining a community of progressive and caring law
professors dedicated to making a difference through the power of law,
- promoting the use of many forms and innovative styles of teaching to
make our classrooms more inclusive, and
- challenging faculty and students to develop legal institutions with
greater equality, justice and excellence.
SALT: Society of American LawTeachers, at http://www.saltlaw.org/index.htm (last visited
June 5, 2004).
6 Chemerinsky is the Sydney M. Irmas Professor of Public Interest Law, Legal Ethics
and Political Science and the Academic Director of the Center for Communications Law
and Policy at the University of Southern California. Faculty of Law Biography: Erwin
Chemerinsky, at http://lawweb.usc.edu/faculty/echemeri.htm (last visited June 5, 2004).
70 Brief for the Appellees at 1, Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. v.
Rumsfeld, No. 03-4433 (3d Cir. filed Feb. 17, 2004) (noting under a separate question,
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issue in its brief.7' the appellants' brief appealing the district court's order denying
its motion for a preliminary injunction paints a very different, and much more
complicated picture of three separate but related issues, each with its own First
Amendment layers of analysis and implications:
1. Did the District Court err in concluding that the Solomon
Amendment and the military's unwritten policy are subject only
to intermediate scrutiny, where they require law schools (A) to
provide a forum for, and to affirmatively disseminate, the mili-
tary's recruiting message, and (B) to promote one viewpoint -
the military's?
2. Do the Solomon Amendment and the military's unwritten
policy violate the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions by
penalizing a law school with an across-the-board, university-
wide funding ban if the law school adheres to a policy of
refusing to abet a discriminatory employer and disseminate the
employer's recruiting message?
3. Are the Solomon Amendment, and especially the mili-
tary's unwritten policy, unconstitutionally vague because they
give military bureaucrats unbridled discretion to threaten a
university with a complete funding ban based upon inconsistent
standards as to what expressive efforts are permissible?
7 2
Theparties' arguments on these issues-as wellas, where relevant, the arguments
of various organizations filing friend-of-the-court briefs - to the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit are described and contextualized in the remainder of this part
of the article. In particular, Section A sets forth the First Amendment-related
arguments made by and on behalf of the appellants, including FAIR and SALT,
against the Solomon Amendment. Section B articulates the arguments made by the
federal government on behalf of Donald H. Rumsfeld,73 Tom Ridge,74 and the other
however, that Appellants raise a due process question - that the Solomon Amendment is
void for vagueness).
71 Id.
72 Brief for Appellants at 1-2, Forum forAcademic & Institutional Rights (No. 03-4433)
(citations omitted).
13 Rumsfeld, who was sued in his capacity as U.S. Secretary of Defense,
was sworn in as the 21st Secretary of Defense on January 20, 2001.
Before assuming his present post, the former Navy pilot had also
served as the 13th Secretary of Defense, White House Chief of Staff,
U.S. Ambassador to NATO, U.S. Congressman and chief executive
officer of two Fortune 500 companies.
United States DepartmentofDefense: DonaldH. RumsfeldBiography, athttp://www.defense-
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named defendants75 heading the various governmental agencies affected by the
Solomon Amendment.
A. The Appellants' First Amendment Arguments
Although the opening brief filed on behalf of the appellants measures more than
fifty pages in length, the First Amendment-based arguments of the appellants can
be encapsulated in a single sentence: The Solomon Amendment affects three distinct
First Amendment rights of law schools - free speech, academic freedom, and
freedom of expressive association - and it violates three distinct First Amendment
doctrines - the prohibition against viewpoint-based discrimination, the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions, and the void-for-vagueness doctrine.76
Unpacking the three First Amendment rights, starting with the right of free
speech, the appellants argue that law schools are "engaged in quintessential
expression"'7 when they implement and enforce non-discrimination policies. What
is the message? It is, primarily, a pedagogical one - "to teach students that invidious
discrimination is a moral wrong"7 8 and "to preach values of equality, justice, and
human dignity."79 To this extent, the appellants contend that "[liaw school non-
discrimination policies are expressive to the core."8 The appellants are supported
in this contention by the Association of American Law Schools (AALS) in a friend-
of-the-court brief which provides in relevant part:
The AALS and its member schools believe so strongly in the
value of non-discrimination that they have adopted a rule that
failure to comply with this mandate, absent any exemptions,
results in a loss of AALS membership. This strict rule lies at the
link.mil/bios/secdefbio.html (last visited June 5, 2004).
" Ridge, who was twice elected governor of Pennsylvania, is the first Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security, working with "more than 180,000 employees from
combined agencies to strengthen our borders, provide for intelligence analysis and
infrastructure protection, improve the use of science and technology to counter weapons of
mass destruction, and to create a comprehensive response and recovery division." United
States Department of Homeland Security: Tom Ridge Profile, at http://www.dhs.gov/dhs-
public/display?theme= 1 &content= 13 (last visited June 5, 2004).
" These other individual defendants include: Elaine Chao, U.S. Secretary of Labor;
Tommy Thompson, U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services; and Norman Mineta, U.S.
Secretary of Transportation. Brief for Appellants, Forum forAcademic & InstitutionalRights
(No. 03-4433).
76 Id. at 19.
17 Id. at 20.
78 Id. at 2.
'9 Id. at 13.
80 Id. at 16.
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heart of the law school mission, and ensures that AALS member
schools convey the message that discrimination in the law
school community is unacceptable.8
Second, in terms of an unenumerated First Amendment right of academic
freedom, the appellants contend that "if academic freedom means anything, it means
that the decision [to teach non-discrimination values] is the law school's to make,
free from government interference."82 In support of this proposition, the appellants
cite the Supreme Court's decision in Sweezy v. New Hampshire.83 Justice Felix
Frankfurter, concurring in Sweezy, cited with approval a statement made about
academic freedom in South Africa - that it includes not only what to teach, but
how it shall be taught.'
Interestingly (albeit not surprisingly) on this point, the appellants carefully avoid
the Supreme Court's statement made more than thirty years ago that "[t]he college
classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly 'the marketplace of ideas."' 85
This declaration clearly conflicts with the appellants' position: if a university truly
is a marketplace of ideas with all that this powerful free-speech metaphor portends,
8 6
then one reasonably would expect universities not only to allow, but to openly
welcome, all messages on campus to compete freely and fairly, including those of
the military in its recruitment sessions in the "surrounding environs."87 The appellants
cleverly dodge this dilemma, however, by citing favorable high court language
embodied with rich marketplace-of-ideas overtones: "Academic freedom thrives not
only on the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and
students... ,but also, and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous decision making
" Brief of Amicus Curiae Association of American Law Schools in Support of
Appellants at 2, Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, No. 03-4433
(3d Cir. filed Jan. 12, 2004).
82 Brief for Appellants at 21, Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights (No. 03-4433)
(citation omitted).
83 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
84 Id. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
8 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972).
86 'The 'marketplace of ideas' is perhaps the most powerful metaphor in the free speech
tradition." SMOLLA, supra note 5, at 6. It "consistently dominates the Supreme Court's
discussions of freedom of speech." C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF
SPEECH 7 (1989). The metaphor is frequently used today, more than eighty years after it first
became apart of First Amendmentjurisprudence with Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr.'s often-quoted admonition "that the best test of truth is the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market." Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616,630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See generally W. Wat Hopkins, The Supreme Court
Defines the Marketplace ofideas, 73 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 40 (1996) (providing
a relatively recent review of the Court's use of the marketplace metaphor).
87 Healy, 408 U.S. at 180.
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by the academy itself."8 The emphasized language makes clear that, from the
appellants' perspective, the only bona fide players in a university's marketplace of
ideas are teachers and students, not outside individuals or entities such as the
military. The appellants are supported in their academic freedom argument by, not
surprisingly, the American Association of University Professors in an amicus brief.89
It argues "that the Solomon Amendment places an excessive and unconstitutional
burden on the academic freedom of law schools and their faculties to choose the
manner in which they establish an academic environment free from discrimination
and teach important concepts of legal ethics and justice."'
Finally, the third First Amendment interest at stake, according to the appellants,
is the right of expressive association. The appellants argue that a university is an
"organization with an expressive purpose."'" In the context of the right of academic
freedom discussed above, this right of association, along with the right of speech,
is "more pronounced and more rigorously safeguarded than the same rights in other
contexts. 9 2
Ironically, to support this argument, the appellants rely in large part on the
Supreme Court's holding in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale93 - a case that ruled
against the application of an anti-discrimination law and in favor of the Boy Scouts'
right to exclude gay scout leaders.94 The appellants cite Dale for the proposition that
a state law that prohibited "the Boy Scouts from firing the scoutmaster undermined
the values the organization tried to teach. 95 They contend that this principle applies
with even more force in the case of the ability of law schools to exclude military
recruiters "because the law school's message is so much more explicit and central ' 9 6
than the message of the Boy Scouts' views on homosexuality.
Compounding the irony is the appellants' use of a second decision involving
homosexual discrimination in order to stake their claim to an expressive association
8 Brief for Appellants at 21-22, Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights (No.
03-4433) (quoting Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 n.12 (1985))
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
'9 Brief of Amicus Curiae American Association of University Professors in Support of
Appellants and Reversal of the District Court Decision, Forum for Academic & Institutional
Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, No. 03-4433 (3d Cir. filed Jan. 12, 2004).
90 Id. at 5.
9' Brief for Appellants at 22, Forum forAcademic & Institutional Rights (No. 03-4433).
92 id.
13 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000) (holding that the application of New Jersey's public
accommodations law "violate[d] the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive
association").
" Brief for Appellants at 22-25, Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights (No.
03-4433).
" Id. at 23 (citation omitted).
96 Id.
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right. In particular, the appellants favorably cite 97 the Supreme Court's opinion in
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston.98 In that
case, the Court held that Massachusetts could not require private citizens who
organized a parade to include among the marchers a group imparting a message the
organizers did not wish to convey.99
How are the First Amendment interests of free speech, academic freedom, and
freedom of expressive association harmed or interfered with by the Solomon
Amendment? The appellants contend there are multiple injuries and interferences
with these rights. They are addressed below.
1. Muddling the Message, Silencing the Students
First, the appellants contend that, by being forced to allow military recruiters on
campus upon penalty of losing federal funds, their own message of equality and
justice "is not getting through."" This, in turn, has caused a palpable "chilling
effect within the law school communities,"' as "[d]iscourse has suffered"' 2 and
"some students feel like second-class citizens, marginalizing them and silencing
them.'
10 3
It is important to note the appellants' use of the chilling effect argument as it
relates to the silencing of student speech on campus. This is very much reminiscent
of the now aging arguments from the late 1980s and early 1990s of those who would
restrict so-called "hate speech"" on college campuses through the use of speech
codes.'0 5 From the perspective of hate speech opponents, "the visceral shock and
the preemptive impact of hate speech silence[s] minorities.""'4 As Professor Owen
Fiss describes it, hate speech may have a "silencing effect" that "disables or
97 id. at 22-23.
98 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
99 Id. at 559.
"oo Brief for Appellants at 13, Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights (No. 03-4433).
Id. at 14.
102 Id.
103 Id.
"4 Although there is no legal definition of hate speech, it may be thought of as "speech
that expresses hatred or bias toward members of racial, religious, or other groups." Nadine
Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484,
487 (1990).
"' See generally ROBERTD. RICHARDS, FREEDOM'S VOICE: THE PERILOUS PRESENT AND
UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 27-38 (1998) (describing the rise of speech
codes on college campuses).
1"6 Stephen Fleischer, Campus Speech Codes: The Threat to Liberal Education, 27 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 709, 731 (1994).
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discredits a would-be speaker."' 10 7 It has been said that hate speech's "sole purpose
is to intimidate and silence.""1 8
For the opponents of the Solomon Amendment, such silence is anything but
golden. In particular, the military's policy of "don't ask, don't tell" is directly aldn
to hate speech. In turn, the on-campus presence of military recruiters, who embody
that discriminatory policy, causes harm in the form of silence to certain law
students, according to the appellants.'°9
Even more striking here are the parallel arguments that underlie both the case
against hate speech and the case against the Solomon Amendment. Professor
Charles R. Lawrence III, in a seminal article regarding hate speech and the need to
restrict it on college campuses, wrote in 1990 that "[a]t the center of the controversy
is a tension between the constitutional values of free speech and equality."'"1
Similarly, the case against the Solomon Amendment also can be framed or pitched
as one of speech versus equality. In particular, it is the speech of the military,
reflected in its anti-homosexual "don't ask, don't tell" policy"' and embodied by the
presence of its recruiters speaking on campus, that constitutes hate speech. As the
appellants write in their brief, the military conveys "a message [the law schools]
abhor - a message of discrimination that violates the core values they inculcate in
their students and faculty."' 1 2 This abhorrent speech, in turn, interferes both with
the message of equality conveyed by the anti-discriminatory policies of law schools,
and with the law schools' efforts to create an environment of equality on campus.
The hate speech parallel, from the perspective of the appellants, should not be
stretched too far. Why? Because, as Helen Ginger Berrigan, Chief Judge for the
United States District Court of the Eastern District of Louisiana, recently observed,
"the First Amendment guarantees that hate speech will have a unfettered forum in
the marketplace of ideas."
'
"
13
It also is significant to note that the appellants contend that the military's
presence on campus interferes with the mission of law schools in "nurturing a
delicate academic environment."' 4 Such language may strike the appellate court
judges, who know the rough and tumble of both the legal profession and the highly
competitive nature of law school, as somewhat disingenuous. The idea of a
'0' OWEN M. FIss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 25 (1996).
"' Judge Helen Ginger Berrigan, "Speaking Out" About Hate Speech, 48 Loy. L. REV.
1, 8(2002).
"'o Supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
..0 Charles R. Lawrence IlI, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 434 (1990) (emphasis added). See Berrigan, supra note 108,
at 2 ("The purpose of hate speech is to promote inequality and intolerance.").
... See supra note 50 and accompanying text (describing the policy).
12 Brief for Appellants at 2, Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights (No. 03-4433).
13 Berrigan, supra note 108, at 15.
"' Brief for Appellants at 20, Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights (No. 03-4433)
(emphasis added).
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"delicate academic environment" also conflicts with the appellants' citation to
language from the Supreme Court that academic freedom thrives "on the independ-
ent and uninhibited exchange of ideas."" 5 The give-and-take, push-and-pull of the
marketplace of ideas butts up against the contrived image of "nurturing""' law
school professors who foster a "delicate academic environment." ' 7
2. Compelling Speech, Remaining Silent
The Supreme Court has long recognized that "Ujust as the First Amendment
may prevent the government from prohibiting speech, the Amendment may
prevent the government from compelling individuals to express certain views."' 8
As Professor Gabriel Chin and Saira Rao recently observed, "the Court has made
clear that the First Amendment prohibition against compelled speech is extremely
robust."' 19
It is not surprising, then, that the appellants argue to the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit that the Solomon Amendment and, in particular, the military's
current interpretation of it, "is directed at forcing schools to disseminate or post
the military's literature and give military recruiters access to a recruiting forum."'
The appellants argue that the military broadly interprets the Solomon Amendment,
such that it "compels law schools to disseminate the opposite message"'' from that
which law schools would like to disseminate. Such enforcement of a compelled-
speech requirement - as the appellants put it, "compelled communications
assistance ' - violates, according to the appellants," 3 the principles of Hurley
discussed earlier.124
3. The Viewpoint-Based Nature of the Solomon Amendment
Viewpoint-based discrimination against expression is described by the Supreme
Court as "an egregious form of content discrimination." 2' As Stanford University
"15 Id. at 21 (quoting from Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 n.12
(1985)).
116 Id. at 20.
117 Id.
"' United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405,410 (2001) (citations omitted).
"9 Gabriel J. Chin & Saira Rao, Pledging Allegiance to the Constitution: The First
Amendment and Loyalty Oaths for Faculty at Private Universities, 64 U. Prlr. L. REv. 431,
434 (2003).
.20 Brief for Appellants at 16, Forum for Academic & InstitutionalRights (No. 03-4433).
121 Id. at 24.
122 Id. at 27.
123 Id. at 24.
124 Supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
12' Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
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Law School Dean Kathleen Sullivan and her late colleague, Professor Gerald
Gunther, observed, "[t]he Court generally treats restriction of the expression of a
particular point of view as the paradigm violation of the First Amendment."'1
2 6
The Court has embraced the concept of viewpoint neutrality, 27 while viewpoint
discrimination is scorned. 2 '
The appellants contend that the Solomon Amendment runs afoul of the
prohibition against viewpoint-based laws.'29 In particular, they argue that:
the focus of the regulation is viewpoint-specific: The only recruit-
ing message that the government has ordered schools to dissemi-
nate and accommodate is the government's military-recruiting
message, and the government penalizes only those who exclude
that message in protest. Viewpoint-specific regulation - even
regulation of speech that would otherwise be afforded less
protection - is subject to strict scrutiny.13 0
Under the standard of strict scrutiny referred to by the appellants, the govern-
ment may "regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to
promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the
articulated interest."'' It is the standard of judicial review to which content-based
laws are subject.32
The appellants contend that while "[tihe government's interest in raising an
army is compelling"' 3 3 and that "so, too, we can presume is its interest in hiring JAG
lawyers,"'" the government has failed to show that the Solomon Amendment is
26 KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAw 212 (2d ed.
2003).
127 See Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 233-34
(2000) (discussing favorably the principle of viewpoint neutrality in the context of First
Amendment jurisprudence surrounding the distribution of mandatory student activity fees
at public universities).
'28 Justice William Brennan once remarked that "[v]iewpoint discrimination is censorship
in its purest form and government regulation that discriminates among viewpoints threatens
the continued vitality of 'free speech."' Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37, 62 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"2 See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) ("[A]
content-based speech restriction" is constitutional "only if it satisfies strict scrutiny." To
satify this test a statute "must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government
interest.").
130 Brief for Appellants at 16, Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights (No. 03-4433).
'3' Sable Communications of Calif., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
132 See Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. at 813.
3 Brief for Appellants at 39, Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights (No. 03-4433).
134 l
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necessary to further either of these asserted interests. 135 The appellants contend that
"[t]he government has never presented a shred of evidence that the military needs
to force its way into private forums - much less co-opt others to disseminate its
message - in order to recruit lawyers effectively."' 136
The appellants are supported in this contention regarding the lack of evidence
of any negative effect on the military by the Servicemembers Legal Defense
Network in a friend-of-the-court brief.'37 It argues that the appellate court "should
not blindly defer to the government's asserted interest, or assume that the Solomon
Amendment is necessary to further that interest."'138
4. The Imposition of Unconstitutional Conditions
The twentieth century doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, which "maintains
that government may not condition benefits on the forfeiture of constitutional
rights,"'39 has been described by Harvard constitutional law scholar Laurence Tribe
as "now somewhat eroded."'140 Despite this fact, the appellants use it to pin much
of their argument to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. In particular, they
argue that the surrender of First Amendment rights of speech and expressive
association that takes place under the Solomon Amendment and the military's
interpretation of it:
is a violation of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. This
condition is couched in terms that are most offensive to First
Amendment values. Whereas other conditions the Supreme
Court has struck have tied the strings to specific programs
funded by government dollars, here the government has regu-
lated the speaker, not just the program, threatening to withdraw
every penny from an entire institution for a protest emanating
from one corner. 4 '
135 Id.
136 Id.
13' Brief of Servicemembers Defense Network as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellants Fair, et al. and Reversal of the District Court, Forum for Academic & Institutional
Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, No. 03-4433 (3d Cir. filed Jan. 12, 2004).
138 Id. at 2.
13' David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in
Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 675, 679 (1992).
140 LAURENCE H. TRBE, AMERICAN CONSTrUTIONALLAW § 10-8, at 681 (2d ed. 1988).
... Brief for Appellants at 16-17, Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights (No.
03-4433).
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This last part of the argument - that the Solomon Amendment punishes an
entire university's federal funding simply because of the actions of one of its units,
namely a law school - is particularly crucial for the appellants. Why? Because the
appellants rely on it to distinguish their case from Rust v. Sullivan1 42 and United
States v. American Library Association14 3 in which, as the appellants acknowledge,
"the Supreme Court ... tolerated some strings attached to specific programs that
Congress itself creates." 1" For instance, they distinguish the holding in Rust by
arguing that:
even while upholding a law prohibiting doctors in a federally
funded family planning clinic from counseling about abortions,
the Court went out of its way to point out that the restriction was
limited to the activities of the specific program funded, within
that clinic's discrete space, and not to activities in the rest of the
hospital. 1
45
With the Solomon Amendment, the appellants argue that "[t]he government has
crossed this constitutional line by withdrawing eligibility for all federal grants and
contracts from every program within a university just because a law school asserts
its constitutional right not to help military recruiters disseminate their messages.""
The appellants thus contend that the Solomon Amendment violates the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions since the funding is conditioned on surrendering a First
Amendment right not to speak (the compelled speech argument noted above) and
the freedom of expressive association. 147
5. The Vagueness of Solomon
In order to avoid being declared unconstitutionally void for vagueness, a statute
must be "sufficiently clear that persons of ordinary intelligence can determine what
is prohibited." '48 The appellants argue that the Solomon Amendment's phrase "in
142 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
143 539 U.S. 194 (2003). In this case, the Court held that denying federal assistance to
public libraries for Internet access unless they installed software to filter pornographic
computer images was not unconstitutional. Id.
'" Brief for Appellants at 36, Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights (No. 03-4433)
(citations omitted).
' Id. (citations omitted).
146 Id. at 37.
141 Id. at 38.
148 Hills v. Scottsdale Unified Sch. Dist., 329 F.3d 1044, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation
omitted), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1146 (2004).
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effect prevents"'4 9 is so ambiguous in meaning that it has been exploited by the
military recruiters "to demand absolute parity of treatment with non-discriminating
employers."' ° They contend that "the military's interpretation [of the Solomon
Amendment] has been a moving target, leaving schools second guessing as to what
expressive activities will trigger harsh funding penalties - and how harsh the
penalties could be - and leaving military bureaucrats free reign to target different
schools with different standards."'' Such vagueness, the appellants argue, "is
especially offensive to First Amendment values because it vests military bureaucrats
with the power to adopt their own idiosyncratic interpretations of the Solomon
Amendment, and apply them inconsistently to different parties. ' '
In summary, the appellants contend that there are multiple ways, ranging from
compelled speech to unconstitutional conditions to vagueness problems, in which
their rights of free expression, expressive association, and academic freedom are
violated by the Solomon Amendment and the military's aggressive enforcement of
it since September 11, 2001. The next section describes the counter-arguments of
the military on selected points mentioned above.
B. The Appellees' First Amendment Arguments
The government opens its brief on appeal by asserting that the Solomon
Amendment's funding limitation is justified by the Spending Clause of the United
States Constitution, '53 as well as the Army and Navy Clauses'- and the Necessary
and Proper Clause."' The government then contends that, from a public policy
perspective, "[t]he Solomon Amendment reflects Congress's determination that the
security of the United States depends on the caliber of its military personnel and that
the exclusion of military recruiting from university campuses undermines the ability
of the armed forces to enlist skilled men and women in the nation's defense."'' 56
Turning to the substantive First Amendment issues of free expression, academic
freedom, and freedom of expressive association, the government contends that:
The Solomon Amendment leaves educational institutions, their
faculties, and their students free to express whatever views they
may have regarding any military policy. The Solomon Amend-
1'9 Supra note 56 and accompanying text.
"' Brief for Appellants at 42, Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights (No. 03-4433).
... Id. at 4 1.
112 Id. at 43 (citations omitted).
' Brief of the Appellees at 2, Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. v.
Rumsfeld, No. 03-4433 (3d Cir. filed Feb. 17, 2004) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1).
I5 d. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-13).
15 Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18).
156 Id.
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ment is directed not at what law schools or other educational
institutions wish to say, but instead at what they wish to do -
namely, to deny military recruiters entry to campuses and access
to students.15
7
In the preceding passage, the military draws a dichotomy between speech and
conduct. This is important because, as the Supreme Court recently observed in
striking down a federal law that targeted virtual child pornography, "the Court's
First Amendment cases draw vital distinctions between words and deeds, between
ideas and conduct."' 8 By suggesting that the Solomon Amendment affects only
conduct and not speech, the government clearly attempts to mitigate the First
Amendment interests at stake. Even if recruitment is considered expression, the
government argues that it is merely symbolic expression subject to an intermediate
level of First Amendment scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny.'59
The government further argues that the Solomon Amendment leaves law
schools, and their faculty and students, completely free to engage in First Amend-
ment speech activities that criticize the "don't ask, don't tell" policy: "They may
adopt resolutions condemning the military's policies, hold rallies and marches,
conduct open forums, and distribute leaflets and posters. ' ' 6° The government adds
that "[n]o educational institution has been denied federal funds, or sanctioned in any
other way, for this open and vigorous criticism.' 16' Parsed differently by the
government, "what is missing from this case is any effort by the government to
deprive anyone of that [First Amendment] right."'' 62
In terms of the appellants' contention that the law is viewpoint-based in its
application, the government responds that the Solomon Amendment "does not
discriminate among institutions on the basis of viewpoint; to the contrary, it applies
even if an institution's exclusion of military recruiters is not intended to express any
viewpoint at all.' 63 The government also rejects any notion that academic freedom
is at stake, arguing that the Solomon Amendment "leaves undisturbed the institu-
tion's right to decide who will teach, what they teach, and what will be taught."'
61
Finally, the government contends that the void for vagueness contentions of the
appellants are incorrect, writing that the Solomon Amendment "provides meaningful
legal criteria for determining whether an institution is in compliance with the law's
's Id. at 14-15 (emphasis added).
58 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (citations omitted).
159 Brief of the Appellees at 22, Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights (No.
03-4433).
160 Id. at 18.
161 id. at 19.
162 Id. at 18.
163 id. at 15.
'64 Id. at 16.
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funding preconditions, and it minimizes the risk of arbitrary decision-making by
centralizing decision-making in a single official."
165
With these summaries of the parties' arguments in mind, the next part of this
article turns to the district court's decision in Forum for Academic and Institutional
Rights.66 That decision, as will be seen, provides partial victory on standing to the
appellants, but denies them the injunctive relief that they sought against enforcement
of the Solomon Amendment.
IlI. THE DISTRICT COURT WEIGHS IN: STANDING TO SUE, BUT No PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION
In his November 2003 opinion, United States District Judge John C. Lifland
methodically examined the government's threshold challenge to the plaintiffs'
lawsuit against it 167 - that the academic parties lacked standing to sue.168 He found
that FAIR - though as of yet devoid of any specific injury169 - had "a sufficient
stake in this controversy"'17 0 and that SALT, 17 ' along with the law-professor' 72 and
law-student plaintiffs,'73 alleged enough specific harm to confer standing. 74
16' Brief of the Appellees at 16, Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights (No.
03-4433).
166 291 F. Supp. 2d 269 (D. N.J. 2003).
167 Id. at 284-96.
68 Standing pertains to "[w]hether a party has a sufficient stake in an otherwisejusticiable
controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy." Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727, 731 (1972). To have standing, "[a] plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly
traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the
requested relief." Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (citation omitted).
169 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 286 (The court
concluded that although none of the organization's members had yet lost funding through
enforcement of the Solomon Amendment, "FAIR has satisfied its burden to demonstrate that
it has law school members who have abandoned their non-discrimination policies due to
threatened enforcement.").
170 Id.
'7' Id. at 293 ("SALT members allege an intrusion on their right to receive, benefit from,
and, in some cases, send information - the law schools' message of non-discrimination.").
71 Id. at 294 (finding that, like the organization SALT, the individual law professors -
USC's Erwin Chemerinsky and NYU's Sylvia Law - also are "beneficiaries, senders, and
recipients of the message of non-discrimination sent by their schools' non-discrimination
policies").
' Id. at 295 (finding that the law student association members "have alleged a legally
cognizable injury sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of standing," id., and
agreeing with the individual law student plaintiffs that they are "beneficiaries of law school
policies increasing diversity and directed at inculcating values and fostering an environment
in which respectful debate unfolds," id. at 296).
" Id. at 296 (denying the government's challenge to standing with respect to all plaintiffs).
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The ride, however, was not so smooth for the plaintiffs when the court turned
its attention to the First Amendment basis for their motion for a preliminary
injunction.'75 The case hinged on the prong of the preliminary injunction test that
requires a court to consider the "likelihood of success on the merits of Plaintiffs'
constitutional claims."' 76  The plaintiffs alleged that the Solomon Amendment
lacked constitutional footing because it conflicted with law school recruiting
policies - themselves "saturated with First Amendment value" 7 7 - and intersected
with three "distinct First Amendment rights," namely "academic freedom, freedom
of expressive association, and free speech."'
7 8
To assess the likelihood of success, the district court analyzed the plaintiffs'
case on the basis of three constitutional queries: (1) "whether the Solomon Amend-
ment create[d] an unconstitutional condition by forcing law schools to abandon
their First Amendment rights on pain of losing federal funding"; 79 (2) whether "the
Solomon Amendment discriminates on the basis of viewpoint by promoting a pro-
military recruiting message";18 0 and (3) whether the language of the Solomon
Amendment is unconstitutionally vague.'S
A. Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions
It is a well-established notion that the government "has the discretion to
decide what activities to fund."' 8 2 Equally clear, however, "is the principle that the
175 In order to obtain a preliminary injunction in the Third Circuit,
plaintiffs must show both (1) that they are likely to experience
irreparable harm without an injunction and (2) that they are reasonably
likely to succeed on the merits. A court may not grant this kind of
injunctive relief without satisfying these requirements, regardless of
what the equities seem to require.
Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484 (3d Cir. 2000).
176 Forumfor Academic & Institutional Rights, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 296. The requirements
for preliminary injunctive relief are "four well-settled conditions":
(1) a "reasonable likelihood" of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood
of "irreparable harm" absent the relief sought; (3) the harm to plaintiffs
by denying preliminary injunctive relief outweighs the harm to the
government by granting such relief; and (4) preliminary injunctive
relief would serve the public interest.
Id. (citations omitted).
"' Id. at 297 (internal quotation marks omitted).
178 Id.
17 Id. (noting that although "Congress has wide latitude in imposing conditions on the
receipt of federal funding," it is "not without bounds").
180 Id.
181 Id.
82 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, § 7.3.1, at 535 (discussing the government's funding
decision with respect to planned parenthood clinics in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991)).
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government cannot condition a benefit on the requirement that a person forgo a
constitutional right."' 83 With respect to the Solomon Amendment, the plaintiffs
argued that the government placed them in an untenable position - "requiring law
schools to provide affirmative assistance to military recruiters"" - when, in fact,
"Congress cannot command law schools even to admit the military to campus to
'disseminate its recruiting message so long as that message is anathema to their
mission and undermines their expressive goals.""
'18 5
The District Court disagreed, finding that even if some assistance to the military
on the part of the schools is necessary, "the alleged intrusion on Plaintiffs' First
Amendment interests still falls short of a constitutional violation."', 6
The court began its analysis by looking at the Spending Clause, 87 which grants
broad powers to the government to impose and collect taxes and use those funds for
the protection and general welfare of its citizens.' 88 First, the court observed that
cases interpreting the government's authority under the Spending Clause have
uniformly found that "Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal
funds, and has repeatedly employed the power to further broad policy objectives by
conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient with
federal statutory and administrative directives.' 8 9 Second, the court noted that this
principle was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in 2003 in United States v. American
Library Association, "' a case in which Congress conditioned the receipt of a special,
federally-discounted Internet rate to libraries on installation of software filtering out
pornographic computer images. 9' Third, the court, quite simply, found it to be
"evident that the Solomon Amendment furthers important policy objectives."' 92
Despite these fairly clear directives, however, the court agreed with the plaintiffs'
contention "that the Spending Clause cannot categorically trump the Bill of
Rights."'93 Nonetheless, prior case law that balances Spending Clause powers with
First Amendment rights - under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions - fails
"to provide a controlling framework for assessing the Solomon Amendment's
constitutionality"' 94 because the Solomon Amendment "does not directly target
'13 Id. § 11.2.4.4, at 946.
s Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 297.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 298.
117 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
188 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights; 291 F. Supp. 2d at 298.
189 Id. (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987)).
'o Id. (citingAm. LibraryAss'n, 539 U.S. 194,203 (2003)) ("Congress has wide latitude to
attach conditions to the receipt of federal assistance in order to further its policy objectives.").
'9' Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
192 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 298.
193 Id. at 299 (citations omitted).
194 , i
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speech or, as will be seen, discriminate on the basis of viewpoint."' 95 Accordingly,
the court needed to delve further into the plaintiffs' First Amendment claims
because "the Solomon Amendment, as an exercise of the congressional spending
power, will not create an unconstitutional condition unless the alleged infringement
on Plaintiffs' First Amendment interests rises to the level of a constitutional
violation."' 9
The first such claim by the plaintiffs focused on alleged violations of their
academic freedom.'97 Although the very concept "eludes precise definition,"'98 the
plaintiffs argued "that if academic freedom means anything, it means that the
decision as to what to teach is the law schools' to make, without governmental
interference."' 99 While the court conceded that academic institutions should be
afforded "a degree of deference.., within constitutionally prescribed limits"200 with
respect to academic decision-making, it held to the view that "a university is not
impervious to competing societal interests."' Put slightly different, institutional
decisions "must be considered in proper context and not in disregard of any
controlling facts or competing interests.
' 20 2
As was the case with the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, the court here
found that prior application of the law involving academic freedom was not helpful
in handling the plaintiffs' allegation because most previous cases "dealt with direct
and serious infringements on individual teachers' speech or associational rights. 20 3
The law faculty and students are not harmed in such fashion by the enforcement of
the Solomon Amendment because "on its face, [it] does not interfere with academic
discourse by condemning or silencing a particular ideology or point of view. '"204
In short, the court found that "the precise contours of this First Amendment
interest are somewhat unclear,"2 5 and if there is to be any violation of the plaintiffs'
academic freedom "it is because [the Solomon Amendment] also intrudes on their
rights to free speech and expressive association. 2 °6
Id. at 299.
196 Id. at 301.
197 id.
191 WIuLAM A. KAPLN & BARBARA A. LEE, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION 299 (3d
ed. 1995) (describing how educators view the concept of academic freedom "in reference to
the custom and practice, and the ideal, by which faculties may best flourish in their work as
teachers and researchers" while lawyers and courts see it "as a catch-all term to describe the
legal rights and responsibilities of the teaching profession").
1' Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 301.
200 Id. at 302 (citation omitted).
201 Id. (citation omitted).
202 Id. (citations omitted).
203 Id. (citations omitted).
204 id.
20 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 302.
206 Id. at 303. "The freedom of expressive association is rooted in the freedom to
collectively espouse beliefs and ideas," N. Nicole Edejann, Note, Coming Out is a Free Pass
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The district court observed that groups need to show very little to demonstrate
that they engage in expressive association.20 7 Under this "de minimis threshold," it
had no trouble finding that "law schools qualify as expressive associations entitled
to constitutional protection."2 " Nonetheless, the court was unconvinced that "the
forced inclusion on their campuses of an unwanted periodic visitor would
significantly affect the law schools' ability to express their particular message or
viewpoint."
20 9
Similarly, the court was not persuaded that having military recruiters on campus
would dilute the law schools' position on non-discrimination. In fact, the court
found the situation brought on by the application of the Solomon Amendment to be
quite distinguishable from the Boy Scouts' prevailing argument in Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale,21° in which that group sought to exclude "an avowed homosexual
and gay rights activist" because he did not fit the values that the organization
espoused. T' To the contrary, Judge Lifland found that "the Solomon Amendment
does not compel the law schools to accept the military recruiters as members of their
organizations, not to mention bestow upon them any semblance of authority." '12 In
all respects, the court concluded, the law schools remain "free to proclaim their
message of diversity and tolerance as they see fit, to counteract and indeed
overwhelm the message of discrimination which they feel is inherent in the visits of
the military recruiters. '"2"3
Moreover, the district court found the Solomon Amendment imposed no
obligation on the part of the law schools to endorse, in any way, the activities of the
military recruiters. Consequently, the court refused to view it as "an outright
compulsion of speech," as the plaintiffs had argued.
214
Judge Lifland similarly was unmoved by the plaintiffs' claim that, by assisting
recruiters, they were being forced to impliedly endorse the military's recruiting
message. Using the well-established principle that "[c]onduct must be 'sufficiently
Out: Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 34 AKRON L. REV. 893, 895 (2001), which may be
impaired by imposing restrictions on the group's ability to exclude those with different
ideologies or philosophies. See id. (discussing the tension between an organization's freedom
of expression and public accommodation laws).
207 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 303.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 304.
210 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
211 Id. at 644.
212 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 305.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 306 (dismissing the plaintiffs' contention that the instant case is analogous to the
situation in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
557 (1995), in which the Supreme Court found a parade to be "an inherently expressive
activity" and thus it "violated the First Amendment to force the parade organizers to include
messages they found inimical").
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imbued with elements of communication' to implicate the First Amendment, '215 the
court found that whatever conduct that may be associated with enabling the recruiter's
visit to campus does not meet the test to compel First Amendment protection.1 6
Finally, the court also rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the Solomon Amend-
ment should be subjected to strict scrutiny review, finding instead that the
appropriate standard of review in a case where the government action involves
conduct that has an incidental effect on free expression is the mid-level scrutiny test
articulated in United States v. O'Brien.2 17
Under an O'Brien analysis, the government prevails, according to Judge Lifland.
First, it is within the government's power "to raise and support a military." '218
Second, the Solomon Amendment furthers a substantial government interest because
"[aiccess to law schools and their students is an integral part of the military's effort
to conduct 'intensive recruiting campaigns to obtain enlistments. -'219 Third, the
Amendment is "unrelated to the suppression of ideas" in that "law schools are free
to take ameliorative actions to disclaim any endorsement of the military's recruiting
policy. '2  Fourth, the statute does "not burden substantially more speech than is
necessary to further the government's legitimate interests. 22'
In sum, the court's elaborate analysis concluded that the Solomon Amendment
does not rise to the level of an unconstitutional infringement upon the plaintiffs' free
speech and associational rights and thus does not present an unconstitutional
condition.222
B. Viewpoint Discrimination
The court was quick to dismiss the plaintiffs' claim that the Solomon Amend-
ment amounted to unconstitutional viewpoint-based discrimination.23 because it
215 Id. at 309 (citations omitted).
216 Id.
217 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
A regulation is justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance
of that interest.
Id. at 377.
218 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 312.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 314.
221 Id. at 313 (citation omitted).
222 Id. at 314.
223 See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 124 (observing that the Supreme Court
"generally treats restriction of the expression of a particular point of view as the paradigm
violation of the First Amendment").
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promoted "only a pro-military recruiting message and by punishing only those
schools that exclude the military because of a belief that the military's recruiting
policy is immoral. 224 It suggested that any impact on speech caused by the statute
was incidental and that there was "virtually no risk of excising specific ideas or
viewpoints from the public discourse.""z
Under the Solomon Amendment, a law school would forfeit federal funding if
it blocked recruiters from campus "regardless of the viewpoint that prompted the
decision to deny access to such recruiters. '"226 The court also relied on the notion
that an institution that accepts the funding and permits on-campus military recruiting
can still "voice objections and take ameliorative actions to disassociate itself from
the military recruiters. 227 In fact, the court pointed to the record before it, which
showed that where schools had complied with the law, "administrators, faculty, and
students have all openly expressed their disapproval of the military's discriminatory
policy through various channels of communication. 228
As to whether targeting specific schools for exemption was indicative of
viewpoint-based discrimination, the court was persuaded that the Solomon
Amendment's exclusion of institutions with "a longstanding policy of pacifism
based on historical religious affiliation" was on solid legal ground.2 9 In the court's
words, "[iut would serve no common-sense purpose to invoke the Solomon
Amendment against pacifist schools where military recruiting efforts would be
futile.
230
C. Void-for- Vagueness Argument
The plaintiffs' argument that the Solomon Amendment must fail because it is
unconstitutionally vague draws upon the statute's specific language that denies
federal funding to a school "that either prohibits, or in effect prevents"23' the
military's recruiting efforts. The plaintiffs contended that the statute does not
provide "clear guidance on what actions or inactions will result in a determination"
that the institution has not lived up to the law.2 2 They further contended that it is
also unclear how a school can determine if it has "satisfied the exemption for
224 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 314.
221 Id. at 315.
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Id. ("Some law schools have posted ameliorative statements throughout the school; law
faculty and student bar resolutions have openly condemned the military's policy; and faculty
and students have held demonstrations protesting the military's presence on campus.").
229 Id. at 316.
23' Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 316.
231 10 U.S.C. § 983 (b) (2003).
232 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 317.
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affording the military a 'degree of access . . . [that] is at least equal in quality and
scope to that afforded to other employers."233
The court found that "[t]he operative terms of the Solomon Amendment are not
complex or difficult to understand such that one of ordinary intelligence must
'necessarily guess' at their meaning." '234 In fact, with respect to the requirements of
providing the military access, the court found the statute to be "abundantly clear. 235
In summary, the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction failed because
the court did not find a likelihood of success on the merits in any of its three
branches of analysis. First, the Solomon Amendment did not unconstitutionally
condition the receipt of federal moneys. Second, the application of the statute did
not amount to viewpoint-based discrimination. Third, the language of the statute did
not meet the void-for-vagueness standard. Because the likeliness-of-success part of
the test for a preliminary injunction was deficient, the court denied the motion.
Whether the appellate court will agree with these conclusions remains to be
seen. The next part of this article suggests a number of extrajudicial forces and
factors that may play a subtle, if not unseen, role in the Third Circuit's decision later
in 2004.
IV. PUTTING THE CASE IN PERSPECTIVE: WHY FORUM FOR ACADEMIC AND
INSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, INC. V. RUMSFELD IS ABOUT MORE THAN THE SOLOMON
AMENDMENT
The case of Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights would appear, at one
level, to boil down to a battle of competing interests in expressing one's message.
The academics want to maintain their message that discriminatory hiring practices
are morally wrong by excluding the military from campus, while the military
recruiters would like to step foot on campus in order to spread their message to law
school students about career opportunities with the armed forces.
But for all of the well-established principles, tests, and doctrines of First
Amendmentjurisprudence involved in Forum forAcademic and InstitutionalRights,
the judicial outcome at the appellate court level may be influenced by the larger
cultural, academic, and legal context in which the case transpires. As Justice
Benjamin Cardozo wrote, the forces at play in the content of judgments "are seldom
fully in consciousness. ' 236
233 Id. (citation omitted).
234 Id. at 319 (citation omitted).
235 id.
236 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 167 (1921).
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They lie so near the surface, however, that their existence and
influence are not likely to be disclaimed. But the subject is not
exhausted with the recognition of their power. Deep below
consciousness are other forces, the likes and the dislikes, the
predilections and the prejudices, the complex of instincts and
emotions and habits and convictions, which make the man,
whether he be litigant or judge.2 37
For Cardozo, a "judge's opinion is really a 'brew.' The judge mixes into the
brew many elements: precedents, logical consistency, customs, morality." '238 Legal
realist Karl Llewellyn, writing nearly seventy-five years ago, suggested that there
are facts and factors not revealed in judicial opinions and that "even an appellate
court officially concerned with rules alone, has been known repeatedly to strain
itself and to strain the rules that it laid down in order to produce what seemed a just
result in the case in hand. '23 9 What external contextual facts and factors might the
judges at the appellate court level take into account when ruling on the constitution-
ality of the Solomon Amendment?
The difficulties of such prognostication and prediction are immense, but there
would appear to be many extrajudicial facts and factors, including issues of
"morality" 24° and the forces of "predilections and the prejudices,"24 that might come
into play in Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, as well as in the other
cases now pending that challenge the Solomon Amendment. As the Introduction
contends, the Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights case is inextricably
bound up in the context of a controversial war and the equally controversial ongoing
gay rights battle - an issue about which some judges surely may possess their own
predilections and prejudices - and it plays out, as a classic clash, on a field
comprised of the conservative quarters of the military and the liberal confines of
elite academe.242
This last contextual factor - that of a battle between conservative and liberal
forces - may seem stereotyped, but it definitely is rooted in reality in this case.
The rhetoric in question makes this clear. For instance, Scott D. Gerber, a law
professor at Ohio Northern University, wrote in December 2003 in the National Law
Journal that the current lawsuits against the Solomon Amendment are united by
237 Id.
238 BERYL HAROLD LEVY, ANGLO-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 94 (1991).
239 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: SOME LECTURES ON LAW AND ITS STUDY
31(1930).
240 LEVY, supra note 238, at 94.
241 CARDOZO, supra note 236, at 167.
242 Supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
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"promotion of a left-wing political agenda.' 243 Contending that "[ilt's no secret that
the vast majority of legal academics are on the far left of the political spectrum,"2' "
Gerber points out that "[ilt's easy for law professors and law students at elite law
schools like Yale and Penn to want to ban the military from recruiting on their
campuses. The world is their oyster, as the saying goes., 245 In an opinion piece in
the Washington Post in support of the Solomon Amendment, a resident scholar at
the American Enterprise Institute claimed that "[a]t some of our top-ranked
universities, patriotism itself is disdained. '246 Even a recent National Public Radio
report on the Solomon Amendment implied the conservative-liberal tension when
a reporter observed that "[s]ince the Vietnam War, many American universities have
had an ambivalent relationship with the military." 247
The plaintiffs-appellants in Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights are
quick to point out in their briefs that when the Solomon Amendment was
proposed, it was intended to "send a message over the wall of the ivory tower of
higher education., 24 s Kent Greenfield, the founder of FAIR, made the conservative-
versus-liberal, military-versus-academia frame clear when he told a reporter for the
Boston Globe, "[t]he Solomon Amendment was passed to send the message that
academic institutions were being too liberal. They are using this law to reach into
the core of our educational philosophy and change it, and that's contrary to the
First Amendment.
249
The battle over the Solomon Amendment thus is being framed25 in the media
- be it the National Law Journal, Washington Post, or Boston Globe - and in the
briefs filed in the case2 1' as a battle with distinct political overtones between
conservatives and liberals and between the military and academia. One New York
Times editorial drew those lines, bluntly opining that "[r]ather than blackmailing its
way onto campuses, the military should make itself truly welcome by not discrimi-
243 Scott D. Gerber, Allow Military Recruitment, NAT'LL.J., Dec. 15, 2003, at 34.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Christina Hoff Sommers, Repressing ROTC, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2003, at B7.
247 Weekend Edition Sunday: Law Schools File Suit to Challenge the Pentagon's View of
a Law Regarding Access by Military Recruiters to Universities and Colleges (National
Public Radio broadcast, Sept. 21, 2003), LEXIS, News library, NPR file.
248 Brief for Appellants at 8, Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights (No. 03-4433).
249 Bombardieri, supra note 9.
250 "Framing" is used here to refer to the rhetorical strategies, including choice of words
and facts, that are used to describe an event, highlighting some issues while suppressing
others, which, in turn, impacts how we think about, understand, and process the event in
question. See generally JOSEPH N. CAPPELLA & KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, SPIRAL OF
CYNICISM: THE PRESS AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 38-48 (1997) (discussing the concept of
framing within the field of journalism).
2' Brief for Appellants at 8, Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights (No. 03-4433).
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nating." '5 2 It is as if the military were literally waging an actual armed battle or
incursion into the ivory towers of non-discriminatory academia.
Such political overtones in the framing of the case cloud the First Amendment
issues and turn, however subtle or unsubtle it may be, the dispute into one between
the conservative right and the liberal left. Placed inside this framework is another
combustible issue that often divides conservatives and liberals - namely, gay
rights. The purported rationale for attacking the Solomon Amendment is that the
military's discriminatory policy against gays and lesbians conflicts with the law
schools' policies of non-discrimination. 253 But the timing of the case suggests another
wrinkle - another external factor that heightens or ratchets up the importance of the
issue. In particular, Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights will be decided
in the context of an election year in which the Commander-in-Chief of the military
has deeply stepped into the so-called culture wars24 on another issue involving gay
rights - same-sex marriages..2 ' The Solomon Amendment case will play out in this
larger cultural context, and it is one that would be impossible for any judge to ignore
as it is mixed into the Cardozo "brew" described above.256 A New York Times story
observed that, in February 2004, the "culture war seemed to be waxing again.' '257
[SIcholars say these cultural divisions could be heightened by a
tough, close election. The parties are increasingly polarized, and
many of their core constituents are in an uncompromising mood.
The courts have been pushing the envelope on issues like gay
rights, justas they did on abortion. Social and religious conserva-
tives feel under siege, furious over what they see as judicial
tyranny that is removing traditional values, one by one, from the
258public square.
If the emphasized observation is true, and given that the Solomon Amendment
is about, in no small degree, a battle over gay rights, one cannot reject out of hand
either the notion that Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights is about more
212 Law Schools, Gays and the Military, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2003, at D12.
253 Supra note 18 and accompanying text.
254 See Frank Rich, The Joy of Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 29, 2004, at B 1
(describing same-sex marriage as the "fulcrum of a culture war in a presidential campaign
year").
251 See Jonah Goldberg, Raising the Volume: Candidates of Both Parties Want to Sit Out
the Culture Wars, but That's Not Possible, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2004, at M l (discussing the
connection among President Bush, the culture wars, and gay marriage).
256 Supra note 238 and accompanying text.
57 Robin Toner, The Nation: To the Barricades; The Culture Wars, Part II, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 29, 2004, at D I (emphasis added).
258 Id.
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than just the constitutionality of a single federal statute, or that some judges may
take into account the metaphorical big picture when ruling in the case. For all the
legal arguments and First Amendment doctrines discussed in Part III,59 the work of
Llewellyn and Brandeis suggests that other influences may play a role in the fate of
the Solomon Amendment.
One also must add to the extrajudicial context the ongoing war in Iraq. The
division of support for the war among conservatives and liberals260 parallels the
framing of the case as one of conservative military forces against the liberal
professorial ranks. A January 2004 poll conducted by the Pew Research Center for
the People and the Press led to the following conclusions:
The partisan gap over the war in Iraq, which briefly narrowed
following Hussein's capture, has again widened. Only about
four-in-ten Democrats (42%) feel the war was the right decision,
down from 56% in December. By comparison, independents
have become somewhat more supportive of the war - 66%
now, 60% then - while Republicans overwhelmingly believe
the war was the right decision.26
Any military war effort obviously is affected by the recruitment of individuals
into the armed services, and therefore the battle over the Solomon Amendment,
which directly affects military recruiting, may reasonably be perceived by some as
a surrogate referendum on the war in Iraq. Indeed, it has been observed in the Yale
Law Journal that "[slince its inception, the Solomon Amendment has been a weapon
in a fully symbolic battle." '262
Finally, the dispute over the Solomon Amendment transpires at the appellate
court level less than one full year after the Supreme Court handed down its decision
in Grutter v. Bollinger.263 In that case, the Court held that the use of race as a factor
in law school admissions decisions, in order to further a compelling interest in the
educational benefits of a diverse student body, does not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause." That victory for academia may infuriate
259 Supra notes 164-235 and accompanying text.
260 For instance, a poll conducted in January 2004 by the Pew Research Center for the
People and the Press found that "four-in-ten Democrats rate progress in Iraq negatively,
compared with just one-in-ten Republicans." Iraq Support Stable, Bush Not Seen as
Unilateralist, PEW RES. CENTER FOR PEOPLE & PRESS, Jan. 22, 2004, at http://peoplepress.
org/reports/display.php3?ReportlD=202.html.
261 id.
262 Amy Kapczynski, Policy Comment, Queer Brinksmanship: Citizenship and the
Solomon Wars, 112 YALE L.J. 673, 675 (2002).
263 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
264 Id. at 343.
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some of the more conservative appellate court judges. What's more, the Supreme
Court emphasized in Grutter the "expansive freedoms of speech and thought
associated with the university environment. "265 This fact may add strength to the
First Amendment-based arguments of the academicians now challenging the
Solomon Amendment.
In addition, Justice O'Connor in Grutter favorably cited Justice Powell's
language from Regents of the University of California v. Bakke266 that "[t]he
freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to education includes the
selection of its student body. '267 Taken to its extreme and as applied to the dispute
over the Solomon Amendment, the logical extension is that the freedom of a
university to make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of which
recruiters to allow (and not to allow) on campus.
The irony of this contextual factor is not lost on one professor at Yale Law
School. In particular, Peter H. Schuck wrote the following in January 2004:
Consider how the schools define merit. Only a few months
before suing Defense on the ground that Solomon prescribes an
alien, illiberal conception of merit, the schools advanced a
different view. In Grutter v. Bollinger, they persuaded the
Supreme Court that the very same attributes that the schools now
say bear no relation to merit can be used to discriminate against
white and Asian applicants. It seems odd for the schools to insist
that they may define merit in a way that disadvantages white,
Asian, and indeed straight applicants (if schools deem other
minorities or gays "diversity-enhancing") but that the military
may not define merit in a way that disadvantages gays.
26 8
The ultimate impact and effect of all of the extrajudicial factors - gay rights,
the war in Iraq, the military versus academia, conservatives versus liberals,
affirmative action - that are swirling around and engulfing the issues of statutory
analysis and constitutional law now before the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit remains to be seen. Obviously, there are extrajudicial concerns that may
influence judges' opinions in any case, but in the battle over the Solomon
Amendment, they seem particularly acute. The authors of this article suggest that
they are extremely difficult to ignore and, indeed, may not be ignored by some
judges in reaching their decisions.
265 Id. at 330.
266 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
267 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (quoting Justice Powell from Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978)).
268 Schuck, supra note 60, at 58.
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V. CONCLUSION
As constitutional scholar Erwin Chemerinsky, one of the individual parties in
Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights,269 wrote in his constitutional law
treatise, "Conditioning a benefit on a requirement that individuals give up their
First Amendment rights obviously pressures individuals to forgo constitutionally
protected speech."27 The response to the Solomon Amendment seems to support
his claim, as several colleges and universities have capitulated to the terms that
Congress imposed upon them in this statute rather than risk a loss of federal
funding.271 Such conditioning provides the legal peg upon which the academic
parties in this case ultimately should prevail.
Chemerinsky, in his book, wrote more broadly about the legal doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions, 272 a principle - it turns out - that is anything but settled
in the law.27 3 The lack of consistency in how courts - particularly the Supreme
Court - have applied this doctrine contributes to the difficulty in coming to an
agreement on specific guidelines for its deployment. 274 Consequently, even those
whose livelihood is drawn from the study or application of constitutional law are left
wondering if the doctrine calls for "an implicit balancing ... weighing the burden
on speech imposed by a condition against the government's justification for the
requirement,, 275 or whether the application is more a product of judicial folly and
thus elusive of any concrete rationale. 276 Stanford University Law Professor and
Dean Kathleen M. Sullivan aptly summed up the controversial nature of the doctrine
more than a decade ago in her comprehensive law review article on the topic:
2 77
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds that
government may not grant a benefit on the condition that the
beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the govern-
ment may withhold that benefit altogether. It reflects the triumph
269 Supra note 69.
270 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, § 11.2.4.4, at 946.
271 See New England in Brief/Cambridge; Harvard to Allow Military Recruiters, supra
note 67.
272 Supra note 270 and accompanying text.
273 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, § 11.2.4.4, at 947 (noting that even the Supreme
Court "has not consistently applied the unconstitutional conditions doctrine").
274 Id. at 950 (concluding that "it is very difficult to reconcile the cases concerning the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine").
275 Id.
276 Id. (questioning whether the inconsistency in rulings can ever be reconciled or whether
"the decisions simply turn on the views of the Justices in particular cases").
277 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1413 (1989).
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of the view that government may not do indirectly what it may
not do directly over the view that the greater power to deny a
benefit includes the lesser power to impose a condition on its
receipt. Consensus that the better view won, however, has not put
an end to confusion about its application. To the contrary, recent
Supreme Court decisions on challenges to unconstitutional
conditions seem a minefield to be traversed gingerly. Just when
the doctrine appears secure, new decisions arise to explode it.27 8
Judge Lifland' s opinion reflected a similar sense of uneasiness with the doctrine,
which appeared to lead him ultimately to conclude that the principle did not fit the
circumstances at hand.279 In his analysis, he noted that "[p]rior cases discussing
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions fail to provide a controlling framework
for assessing the Solomon Amendment's constitutionality." ' Perhaps the opinion
represents his best efforts to walk "gingerly" through the constitutional
"minefield. '2 8' Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, Judge Lifland was not disposed to
expanding the reach of the doctrine and - as he suggested - the previous cases
were "too fact-specific to provide an easy or appropriate avenue for analyzing the
novel constitutional issues raised by the Solomon Amendment." '282
This general uncertainty provides a propitious opportunity for the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit to design an approach that is more consistent with the
principles underlying the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions - one that would
return to the basics of why such a legal mechanism was needed in the first instance.
The initiation of such an approach undoubtedly would benefit the plaintiffs.
As Dean Sullivan has observed, "[d]irectly and through metaphors of duress or
penalty, the Court has repeatedly suggested that the problem with unconstitutional
conditions is their coercive effect." '83 Black's Law Dictionary defines "coerce" as
"[t]o compel by force or threat. ' 2" Without question, the effect of the Solomon
Amendment is to compel universities to comply with its terms.
Moreover, the legislative history of the statute itself provides ample proof that
Congress intended a coercive effect. As mentioned earlier in this article, while
promoting his companion measure to the House version of the bill, Oklahoma
Senator Don Nickles informed his colleagues that "more than 100 colleges and
universities across the country prohibit military recruiters on campus. Yet many are
278 Id. at 1415-16 (footnote omitted).
279 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 314.
280 Id. at 299.
281 See Sullivan, supra note 277, at 1415-16.
282 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 301.
213 Sullivan, supra note 277, at 1428 (suggesting, however, that "the Court's uncons-
titutional conditions rulings display serious inconsistencies in their account of coercion").
2'4 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 252 (7th ed. 1999).
[Vol. 13:205
WISDOM OF SOLOMON
quite receptive when it comes to taking research grants from the Pentagon. This bill
will correct that situation.,
28 5
Based on the language Senator Nickles used, there can be little doubt that the
lawmakers wanted to compel schools to comply with the government's military
recruitment efforts. The loss of federal funding is an enormous incentive for
educational institutions to toe the government line. In essence, what these institutions
give up in exchange is their right to symbolically express - a right protected by the
First Amendment 286 _ their distaste for a governmental policy that discriminates on
the basis of sexual preference.
As Dean Sullivan suggests, "[tihe Court has often invoked coercion as the
reason to strike down conditions that affect rights to freedom of speech, religion,
and association, but without a consistent or satisfying theory." '287 The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit now has the chance to firm up the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions, particularly in this instance where the government's
clear intention is to coerce institutions into complying with the terms of its own self-
enhancing policy. While there is no clear guidance from the Supreme Court on the
use of the coercion rationale,288 it is axiomatic that the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions fully contemplates the practice of the government using federal
appropriations as a metaphorical club against its citizens in a deliberate effort to stop
them from exercising an expressive right.
If the Third Circuit accepts that reasoning - and finds that the Solomon
Amendment imposes an unconstitutional condition - then it logically follows that
the plaintiffs would have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits and
should prevail on the appellate level.
Yet, as Part V makes clear, the factors that ultimately could inform the Third
Circuit's judgment may be extrajudicial in nature. The judges of the Third Circuit
have received this case against a background of a sharply divided populace.2 9 The
external forces coming to bear - the battle over gay rights, affirmative action, and
ongoing military campaigns - are potential influences in a politically-charged
environment. The question remains whether the jurists assigned this appeal will be
able to extricate themselves from the hot-button political issues of the day, or will
those outside factors become the main ingredients in what Justice Cardozo astutely
labeled a judicial "brew." 2
285 Supra note 39 and accompanying text (emphasis added).
286 See TRIBE, supra note 140, § 12-7, at 825-32 (examining the speech-conduct
dichotomy and how certain acts are protected by the First Amendment).
27 Sullivan, supra note 277, at 1433.
288 Id.
289 See supra notes 254-55 and accompanying text.
"90 See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
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